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Minority expropriation could result when controlling shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders and 
profit from private benefits of control. This agency conflict (named Type II) has been rarely studied, as the most 
commonly assumed agency conflict resides between managers and shareholders (Type I). We want to study the 
role of the auditors in reducing the type II agency conflict. Using an audit fees model derived from Simunic 
(1980), we study the impact of type I and type II agency conflicts on audit fees in code law vs common law 
countries. We then focus two civil law countries (Germany and France) providing a lower investor protection 
level, and two common law countries (the USA and UK) providing a higher investor protection level (La Porta et 
al. 1998, 2000). Our results show 1) a negative relation between audit fees and managerial shareholding, which 
is stronger for common law than for civil law countries; 2) a curvilinear (concave) relation between audit fees 
and controlling shareholding for civil law countries; 3) no Type II conflict in the common law countries. These 














































Previous literature evidenced that civil law countries present weak investor protection 
compared to common law countries which gives shareholders incentives to hold large part of 
capital to better control managers (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 2000). Consequently, 
ownership is more concentrated in civil law countries and the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders (called type I agency conflict) is reduced (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Denis and McConnell 2003; Gillan and Starks 
2003). However, this situation gives controlling shareholders the possibility to profit from 
private benefits of control which raises a new agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (called type II agency conflict). Indeed, (La Porta et 
al. 2000, p. 4)  assert that “Investor protection turns out to be crucial because, in many 
countries, expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by the controlling shareholders 
is extensive”.  
Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders
2. We investigate a 
complementary firm-level corporate governance to better protect minority shareholders: 
auditing. Auditors’ role is to increase trust on corporate information by reducing the 
possibility of manipulation of accounting numbers. Traditional audit fees model (Simunic 
1980) explains that the amount of audit fees is a function of (1) the effort of the auditor during 
the engagement and (2) the risk incurred by the auditor after the disclosure of his/her audit 
report (risk premium). Consequently, agency conflicts should influence the risk premium 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008) and thus the audit pricing.  
Most of prior research focuses on the impact of the type I agency conflict on audit pricing 
because they have been mainly made in common law countries, particularly in the USA and 
the UK where ownership is dispersed. These studies find a negative relation between 
                                                 
1 This title has been inspired from Lang et al.’s (2004) title paper: Concentrated control, analyst following, and 
valuation: Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 
589-623. 






































0management ownership and audit fees and conclude that audit plays a governance role to 
mitigate type I agency problems (Agrawal and Jayaraman 1994; Gul and Tsui 2001; Nikkinen 
and Sahlstöm 2004). To our best knowledge, only one study (Fan and Wong 2005) focuses on 
type II agency conflict across countries while this conflict is predominant in the world (La 
Porta et al. 2000). Indeed, controlling shareholders have the possibility to expropriate 
minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control, therefore type II agency 
conflict is likely to influence audit pricing. 
Moreover, Niemi (2005) and Hay et al. (2006) underline that very few studies examined the 
relation between ownership and audit fees and these studies present mixed results about the 
direction and the significance of the relation between ownership concentration and fee levels. 
We suggest two alternative perspectives to explain these ambiguous results. 
First, previous studies define ownership concentration as the insiders’ ownership with the 
exception of only two studies (Peel and Clatworthy 2001; Fan and Wong 2005). Therefore, 
previous research does not distinguish between both types of conflicts, which could 
potentially lead to conflicting effects on audit fees. In this study, we examine the impact of 
both agency conflicts separately. 
Second, based on the results of La Porta et al. (2000), we suggest that the legal system should 
play an important role in influencing audit fees risk premium related to agency conflicts (type 
I vs. type II agency conflicts). We then suggest that in weak investor protection countries, the 
relationship between audit fees and minority expropriation should be curvilinear (concave) 
while the few studies which isolate this conflict assumed its linearity. Namely, it is likely that 
a type II conflict first increases with the percentage of controlling shareholders ownership 
(entrenchment effect). Then, when controlling shareholders hold a very large part of capital, 
their interests could be expected to be aligned with the interests of minority shareholders, 
therefore mitigating type II agency problems and decreasing audit fees (alignment effect). 
We use regression analyses on non financial listed companies over 17 countries (10 code law 
and 7 common law countries) on 2006-2008. We then focus on four countries (Germany and 
Franc for code law and UK and the USA for common law countries). First, the results of this 
study show a negative relation between management ownership and audit fees stronger in 
common law countries than in code law countries. We assume that type I agency conflict is 
less severe in firms where the manager hold large percentage of cash flow rights because he is 






































0scope of the audit engagement. These results support the incentive alignment effect that 
suggests that management ownership contributes to align the manager interests with those of 
the investors. Therefore, auditors charge lower fees for firms where manager hold large 
shareholding than they do for firms where ownership and control is separated. 
Second, we find different results depending on the country investor protection level for the 
relation between ownership concentration and audit fees. In lower investor protection 
environment (civil law countries), we find a significant quadratic relation between the 
controlling shareholders capital rights and audit fees. Audit fees first increase with the 
controlling shareholders ownership: audit could be seen here as a substitution mechanism to 
mitigate internal corporate governance weaknesses. Then, beyond a threshold of around 20-
25%, the relation becomes negative. We assert that very high ownership concentration does 
not harm the interests of minority shareholders: cash flows resulting from the detention of 
shares are superior to the private benefits of control, which contribute to align the interests of 
controlling shareholders with the interests of minority. These results are consistent with the 
Williamson’s (1983) substitution hypothesis. 
In high investor protection countries (common law countries), our results show that 
controlling shareholding level does not influence audit fees. We therefore conclude that the 
type II agency conflict is non relevant in high investor protection (for instance the USA) and 
that auditors do not ask for a risk premium. Our results are coherent with the results of La 
Porta et al. (2000) on investor legal system. In common law countries, the main agency 
conflict is the one opposing shareholders and managers. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, this is the first study that 
examines the influence of agency conflicts (type I and type II) on audit pricing in relation to 
investor protection and legal systems. Also, Niemi (2005) and Hay et al. (2006) notice the 
absence in audit research of studies on ownership structure, particularly the influence of non 
managerial ownership concentration on audit fees. Our study aims to fulfill this need in 
demonstrating that the relation between ownership concentration and fee levels depend on the 
investor protection legal system assuming two levels of investor protection (high: common 
law countries, weak: civil law countries). Then, in civil law countries, the relation is likely to 
be curvilinear: the behavior of shareholders depends of the level of ownership concentration. 
This study therefore contributes to the research on corporate governance mechanisms in 






































0The paper is organized as follows. The next section (section 2) provides the theoretical 
framework and section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design and 
section 5 provides the sample selection procedures and descriptive statistics. Regressions 
results are disclosed in section 6 and discussed in section 7. Finally we summarize the main 
findings and limits of our study. 
2. Investor protection and corporate governance 
2.1  Ownership  concentration  as  a  substitute  governance  mechanism  in 
low investor protection countries 
La Porta et al. (1998) first evidenced that the investor protection regulations and its 
enforcement vary across countries and legal families. They show that civil laws give investors 
weaker legal rights than common laws, the weakest protection being given by French-civil 
law countries (with German-civil-law and Scandinavian countries fallen between the other 
two). Then they wonder whether the poor protection countries have other substitute 
mechanisms of corporate governance. First, they check whether the quality of law 
enforcement substitutes or compensates for the quality of laws. Their results reject this 
hypothesis: the quality of the enforcement is the highest in the Scandinavian and German-
civil-law countries, next highest in common law countries, then again the lowest in French-
civil-law countries. If it does not exist at the country level, a substitute mechanism of 
corporate governance may be set by shareholders themselves. They therefore investigate a 
firm-level substitution mechanism: ownership concentration. They posit two main reasons for 
which ownership in weaker investor protection countries should be weaker. First, “large, or 
even dominant shareholders who monitor the managers might need to own more capital, 
ceteris paribus, to exercise their control rights and thus to avoid being expropriated by the 
managers” (La Porta et al. 1998, p. 1145), which is especially true when legal protection is 
weak.. Second, small investors may not be willing to buy shares at high prices, because of the 
risk of expropriation: therefore, as firms are not likely to issue shares at low prices, this effect 
increases indirectly the ownership concentration. 
La Porta et al ‘s (1998) results suggest that highly concentrated ownership may substitute at 
the firm level for weak investor protection stated at the country level. La Porta et al (2000) 
privilege the legal approach of corporate governance, which “holds that the key mechanism is 






































0system, meaning both laws and their enforcement”. They suggest that the better investor 
protection stated in common law countries can be originated in both the judicial tradition and 
the political history (Roe 2006).  
We posit that within the country level investor protection regulations, internal corporate 
governance mechanisms at the firm level remain pivotal to investor protection to compensate 
agency problems. La Porta et al (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 2000) themselves studied 
the ownership concentration. In relation to this stream, we want to investigate one specific 
corporate governance mechanism: auditing. 
2.2  Auditing: a firm level substitute for investor protection 
Since the role of auditing is to enforce the application of proper accounting polices (Francis 
and Dechun 2008, p. 157), auditing is part of the corporate governance system (Francis et al. 
2003), whose cost has to be beard by the shareholders as one key component of monitoring 
costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). It is therefore expected that the auditors will spend more 
time, relative to regular inspection of accounts, to inspect managers’ activities if the agency 
problem is greater, which may lead to higher audit fees. 
A large body of audit research has focused on the determinants of audit fees (Hay et al. 2006) 
since the original seminal Simunic’s work (1980). This author has developed an audit fees 
model which has become a landmark in audit research. Its starting point is that auditors are 
jointly liable together with the managers of the financial information quality vis-à-vis the 
financial statement users. Consequently, Simunic (1980) develops an audit fees model that 
includes two components: audit effort and risk premium. 
AUDFEE = p*q + E(L) 
Where AUDFEE is the amount of audit fees, p: hourly pricing, q: number of auditing hours, 
E(L): risk premium, assessing the probability of expected losses.  
The first component (p*q) represents the audit effort needed, which depends of the difficulty 
of the audit engagement. The determinants are mainly the size of the client and its 
organization complexity that is largely related to the industrial sector, internationalization 
degree, etc. The second element represents a premium related to the expected risk of paying 






































0Lyon and Maher (2005) argue that much of the prior literature on auditor’s risk focuses on 
litigation risk, which is the risks of incurring liability payments and of damaged reputation for 
the quality of its services (Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 1987; Simunic and Stein 1996; 
Willenborg 1999; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Feldmann et al. 2009). All these studies 
evidence the importance of risk premium component in the audit fees levels due to the 
positive relationship between audit fees and litigation risk. 
Recently, research has also studied the impact of different legal environments on the audit 
fees risk premium. Francis et al.(2003) evidence the effectiveness of auditing as an 
enforcement mechanism in limiting managerial opportunism across different investor 
protection regulation systems.  Francis and Dechun (2008) show that auditor incentives 
change as investor protection regimes become stricter, and there is a greater likelihood that 
client misreporting is detected and auditors are punished. Choi et al. (2009) argue that legal 
environments play a crucial role in determining the auditor’s legal liability and show that 
auditors charge higher fees for firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger legal 
regimes.  
We extend this stream of research by focusing on the impact of differentiated agency conflicts 
across investor protection systems. Hay et al. (2008) posit that previous studies generally 
suggest a substitution effect between internal corporate governance control and external 
auditing, hence better internal control is associated with lower audit fees. However, the 
evidence about this issue is mixed (Hay et al. 2008).  In their literature review on audit fees, 
Hay et al. (2006) advocated for further investigation on this topic as given the observed 
contradictory results. 
3. Hypotheses development 
According to La Porta et al. (1998), the observed difference in ownership concentration 
between common law versus civil law countries should result from the difference in investor 
protection law. One consequence of this finding should be that agency conflicts are not 
similar in both systems. In common law countries, the consequence of a lower ownership 
concentration is that agency conflicts between shareholders and managers are more likely to 
exist (La Porta et al. 2000), as shareholders have less monitoring and controlling power 
through their ownership. By contrast, firms in civil law countries are more likely to be owned 






































0conflict between them and the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2002), but 
increases the likelihood of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The next two sections will consequently develop 
both kinds of agency conflict and their respective impact on audit fees.  
3.1  Low ownership concentration: a type 1 agency cost in high investor 
protection law countries 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) distinguish between “insiders” (management and controlling 
shareholders) and “outsiders”. The former control the firm, are part of their management or 
nominate their members because they hold exclusive voting rights while the latter do not have 
voting rights in excess to their cash flow rights. As strong investor protection countries are 
characterized by a low ownership concentration, it can therefore be hypothesized that the 
dominant agency conflict in these countries should be the conflict between the shareholders 
and the managers. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managerial ownership 
contributes to reduce type I agency conflicts (manager vs. shareholders), in aligning the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders. It is considered as a complementary 
motivation for managers to incite themselves to better control the firm and then achieve better 
performance (Jensen and Warner 1988; Hart and Moore 1990). Consequently, in 
organizational structures characterized by high managerial ownership, the separation between 
ownership and control is lower and information asymmetry is weaker than in other 
organizations, which should result in a weaker demand of assurance (less monitoring cost). As 
a consequence, it can be hypothesized that monitoring costs, including audit fees, are higher 
for firms with lower manager ownerships, as argued by Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994), Gul 
and Tsui (2001). Indeed, DeFond (1992) posits that the extent of agency conflicts determines 
the degree of auditing needed to make management credible to current and potential investors. 
Therefore, the higher the extent of the agency conflicts are, the higher the demand for audit 
quality should be.  
Several studies have established relations between auditor choice or audit fees on the one 
hand and management ownership on the other hand. Agrawal and Jayaraman  (1994), Gul and 
Tsui (2001), Nikkinen and Sahlstöm (2004) found a negative association between audit fees 
and management ownership. Other research shows that the probability to choose a big audit 
firms (audit quality) increase in firms where the information asymmetry is high between 






































0One of the main raisons explaining the decrease in demand of audit quality is that owner-
managers are more invested in daily operational duties. They are consequently more likely to 
better manage the company asset that non owner-managers. Abdel-khalik (1993, p. 49) 
suggests that “the voluntary demand for audit (positive) assurance emanates from the needs of 
owner/managers of privately owned companies to compensate for the loss of control 
associated with increasing organizational complexity”. The amount of audit fees is increasing 
with the organizational complexity. Consequently, firms that are owned by their managers are 
likely to have weaker audit fees. 
Another reason is related to managers’ behavior toward the risk. Jensen (1986) shows that 
managers who invest their own money in the company are more risk adverse in their decisions 
than other managers with a more diversified portfolio. Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
show that the decrease of managerial ownership increases the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders, which increases the demand for a more conservative financial 
statement approach. Using a sample of 648 Australian firms, Gul et al. (2003) show that there 
is a positive association between discretionary accruals and audit fees, and that managerial 
ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between discretionary accruals and 
audit fees. 
Finally, firms that are managed by a manager/owner are characterized by a weaker level of 
information asymmetry, a weaker level of organizational complexity and a weaker audit risk, 
which results in a decrease in audit demand. Moreover, as given the lower ownership 
concentration in strong investor protection countries, agency conflict between shareholders 
and managers should be more accurate. Therefore, we state hypothesis H1 as follows: 
H1: Audit fees are more significantly negatively related to managerial ownership in strong 




Several studies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Denis 
and McConnell 2003; Gillan and Starks 2003) show that in the majority of countries, the 
ownership is concentrated and minority interests are not well protected, particularly in civil 






































0evidenced by La Porta et al ‘s (1998) to substitute for a weak investor protection regulation, 
raises a new concern: minority investor expropriation (La Porta et al. 1998, p. 1151; La Porta 
et al. 2000, p. 4). In a weak investor protection country, controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders have both the right to the same dividend per share (Denis and McConnell 2003). 
However, the former has private benefits of control and can increase his wealth in consuming 
additional perquisites to the detriment of outsider shareholders. Consequently, when 
controlling shareholders have an effective control of the firm via a high percentage of 
ownership, they have incentives to expropriate minority shareholders
3 (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997), which leads to higher agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, 
called type II agency costs. 
Thus, the legal system of investor protection may influence the role of statutory auditors in 
substituting for agency conflicts between both kinds of shareholders. Hence, auditors should 
ask for a higher risk premium for auditing financial statements of firms with high type II 
agency conflict.  
Previous studies having studied the impact of a type II agency conflict on audit fees provide 
mixed results. Fan and Wong (2005) study audit fees determinants in Asia, where family 
ownership is high and investors are less protected. They test whether auditors ask for an 
additional premium to their clients when agency conflicts are high. The authors find a positive 
relation between audit fees and ownership concentration and explain that auditors assume a 
higher risk to audit those firms. However their study did not differentiate between managerial 
and controlling shareholding. Chan et al. (1993) posits that, in the absence of regulation, the 
propensity of firms to demand timely independent audits is a function of the extent of the 
divorce between ownership and control assuming that a high insider ownership contribute to 
mitigate agency conflict between manager and shareholders. Using an initial sample of 985 
UK listed companies that they divided in two sub-samples (big firms vs non big firms), Chan 
et al. (1993) show that insider (managerial and major shareholder ) ownership is negatively 
associated to audit fee of the whole sample and the sub-sample of big firms and is non 
                                                 
3 Expropriation can take a variety of forms. In some instances, the insiders simply steal the profits. In other 
instances, they sell the output, the assets, or the additional securities in the firm they control to another firm they 
own at below market prices. Such transfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often legal, have 
largely the same effect as theft. In still other instances, expropriation takes the form of diversion of corporate 
opportunities from the firm, installing possibly unqualified family members in managerial positions, or 
overpaying executives. “Tunneling” allows controlling shareholders to transfer firm assets and benefits out of the 






































0significant for the small firms sub-sample. Niemi (2005) tests the model of Chan et al. (1993) 
on Finnish firms and finds a non significant relation between audit fees and the measure of the 
combined managerial and non-managerial ownership concentration (i.e. insiders). In France, 
Piot (2001) finds a non significant relation between insider ownership and the choice of big 
audit firm (audit quality). Finally, Hay et al (2006) summarize the large body of audit fees 
determinants research using a meta-analysis and conclude that the results on the relation 
between ownership structure (insiders) and audit fees are mixed and that they should be 
interpreted carefully because of the small number of studies. Niemi (2005) explains these 
result by the fact that managerial and non-managerial ownership concentration should have 
opposite effects on audit fees. After having distinguished between firms that are controlled by 
the management, by a foreign holding or by the state, he finds (1) a significantly negative 
relation between audit fees and management control of the firm; (2) a positive relation 
between audit fees and state control and foreign holding control. 
We already stated a separate hypothesis for managerial ownership. We now focus on the 
major shareholder ownership by assuming a differentiated impact on audit fees depending on 
the investor protection regime. 
We hypothesize a curvilinear relationship between ownership concentration and audit fees in 
weak investor protection countries. To the best of our knowledge, the existence of such a 
curvilinear relation has never been established before
4. When controlling shareholders have 
effective control of the firm via a high percentage of cash flow rights, they have incentives to 
expropriate minority shareholders, which leads to higher type II agency costs. Then, auditors 
demand a high risk premium to audit those firms. Consequently, we suggest a positive 
relation between the controlling shareholders’ ownership and audit fees. But when controlling 
shareholders ownership exceeds a certain level, controlling shareholders have no incentive to 
behave on the detriment of the company interest (and therefore, the minority shareholders 
                                                 
4 We found however studies in corporate governance showing that the behavior of the controlling shareholders is 
not the same depending on the level of ownership. For instance, Morck et al. (Morck et al. 1988) show a 
curvilinear relation between firm value measured by the Tobin’s Q and the proportion of capital hold by insiders. 
Based on a sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms, the authors evidence a significant non-monotonic relationship. 
Tobin's Q first increases with insiders’ ownership beyond a level of 5%, then declines when insider ownership 
exceeds 25%. Using a sample of more than 400 of the largest public Canadian closely-held firms, from 1995 to 
1999, Bozec and Laurin (2008) find a non-monotonic relation between performance and the percentage of cash 
flow of the major shareholders. They suggest that (1) when the ownership is concentrated in the hand of outside 
shareholders, the latter exerts a control on managers because of large blocks of shares that give them an 
economic incentive and enough resources to do it; (2) however, these block shareholders are motivated to 







































0interests). Holding high level of capital leads them to support all the consequences of their 
decisions in terms of wealth: private benefits of control become lower than the potential value 
firm losses that they have to expect (due to decisions that harm minority and company 
interests). Hence, controlling shareholders will manage the firm to maximize its value by 
better controlling the manager or participating in its management. In this context, controlling 
shareholders are the guarantee for a good firm interests’ protection and have therefore no 
incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Consequently, type II agency conflict is lower 
and auditors demand lower audit fees since the risk premium is reduced. Hence, for very high 
level of controlling shareholding, we assume a negative relation between fee levels and 
controlling shareholders cash flow rights. For instance, Francis et al. (2009) in the French 
context find a negative relation between audit quality measured by the choice of two big four 
auditors and the major shareholder ownership
5 when the percentage of his cash flow rights 
exceed 25%. 
We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
H2.1: Audit fees are first positively then negatively associated (concave relation) with the 
ownership concentration in low investor protection countries 
However, firms in well protected environment should not suffer from type II agency conflict 
(controlling vs minority shareholders) and the prevalent agency costs are those due to type I 
agency conflict (managers vs shareholders). For instance, Peel and Clatworthy (2001) did not 
find a significant relationship between audit fees and major shareholding in UK listed firms. 
We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
H2.2: Audit fees are not related to ownership concentration in high investor protection 
countries. 
4. Research design 
We use the following regression model to test our hypotheses:  
                                                 
5 The authors use a dichotomous variable that takes 1 when the major shareholder ownership exceeds 25% of 






































0LOGAUDFEE = β0 + β1 CSHCAP + β2 CSHCAP2 + β3 DCAP            










Where LOGAUDFEE is defined by the natural logarithm of audit fees (in KUSD), 
FSCONTROL denotes firm-specific variables and CSCONTROL denotes country-specific 
variables. All variables are defined in Table1. 
The test variable for H1 is DCAP and represents the managerial ownership. The coefficient on 
DCAP (β3) thus captures the audit fee discount in case of managerial ownership. As H1.1 
states a general negative relationship between managerial shareholding and audit fees, we 
therefore expect β3  to be negative on all countries. However, as H1.2 states a more 
significantly negative relationship between managerial shareholding and audit fees in stronger 
than in weaker investor protection countries, we therefore expect β3 to be more significantly 
different from 0 in common law countries than in code law countries. 
The test variables for H2 are SHCAP and SHCAP2. SHCAP is computed as the sum of the 
shareholders owning more than 5% of the firm shares. Both H3 hypotheses are based on a 
quadratic relationship between the controlling shareholders ownership and the audit fees. Due 
to inherent collinearity issues between the linear and the quadratic terms, we use a 
transformation of the variable SHCAP and mean center it in the following manner: 
CSHCAP= SHCAP – mean (SHCAP), which allows us also to construct CSHCAP2= 
(CSHCAP)
2. 
The expected sign on β2 depends on the hypotheses. As H2.1 states a curvilinear (positive 
then negative) relationship between controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and audit fees 
for lower investor protection countries, then we expect β1 and β2 to be negative for these 
countries. On the contrary, as H2.2 states the absence of relationship between controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and audit fees for higher investor protection countries, then we 
expect the couple (β1 , β2)  to be non significant for these countries.  
Our audit fees model includes two types of firm specific control variables, which control for: 
(1) audit costs (size and complexity); (2) the risk of loss that an audit could face in the future 
(Simunic 1980; Francis 1984; Hay et al. 2006). The audit cost is estimated by LOGSALES 






































0INTPCT. Similar to Simunic (1980) and Choi et al. (2009), we include LOSS and LEV to 
measure the client-specific litigation risk potentially borne by the auditors. Finally, we include 
the audit firm size (BIG) to capture the Big4 premium (Francis 1984). As client size, client 
complexity and client-specific risks should be positively correlated to audit fees, we expect all 
the coefficients from δ1 to δ6 to be positive. 
We include three country-level control variables in the cross-country regressions. First 
Wingate (1997) reports anecdotal evidence based on assessments of a leading underwriter of 
auditor indemnity insurance. Then we expect GDP (Gross domestic product) to have a 
positive association, as audit fees are likely to be higher in rich countries than in poor 
countries. Third the demand for audit services is likely to be higher in countries with more 
foreign direct investments (FDI) than in countries with less. Finally, model includes also fixed 
year effects and country effects and an error term (ε). 
Low and high investor protection countries is implemented through LAW, coding for 
common (LAW=1) and code (LAW=0) countries, to check the impact of the regime on audit 
fees, as common law countries are supposed to demand higher audit fees because of a higher 
likelihood and higher financial sanctions of being liable for any unveiled audit failure (Francis 
and Dechun 2008). We therefore create code and common law subsample. 
5. Sample and descriptive statistics 
Our sample is initially composed of all firms for which audit fee data are provided by 
Worldscope over the period 2006-2008.  Table 2 explains the sample selection process. 
**** Insert Table 2 here *** 
We exclude firm-year observations with missing values for the independent variables, and we 
drop. We dropped two countries (Canada and India) for which ownership data are irrelevant 
and countries with less than 50 observations. We also dropped financial institutions (Standard 
Industrial Classification [SIC] 6000-6999). We finally dropped extreme outliers at the 
country-level and we also removed outliers that have a Cook’s distance value greater than 
4/(sample size) for each regression at the country level. We finally obtain 8 647 firm-year 
observations (hereafter named firm observations for ease of notation).  






































0**** Insert Table 3 here *** 
Data disclosed in this table are consistent with previous literature on similar samples. For 
instance, variable SHCAP (Capital rights of the controlling shareholders) disclose an average 
of 0.26 for the USA, which is consistent with the concentration of 0.20 observed by La Porta 
et al. (1998, p. 1147-1148) on the sole 3 largest shareholders amongst the 10 largest listed 
firms of the country. It has also been noticed that block ownership plays an increasingly 
important role in U.S. capital markets (Brockman et al. 2009). Dlugosz, et al. (2006) find that 
block ownership increased from 21.7% of outstanding shares in 1996 to 25% in 2001 in their 
sample of over 1,900 relatively large firms. 
Same similarities hold for France (0.44 vs 0.34) and Germany (0.45 vs 0.48), but UK exhibits 
a much larger difference (0.33 vs 0.19 in La Porta et al.(1998). These differences could be 
explained by our much larger sample, which therefore includes smaller firms exhibiting larger 
shareholding. When compared to a larger sample, our data exhibit a smaller difference (for 
instance 0.27 obtained on 259 UK quoted firms by Peel et Clatworthy (2001)). 
Control variables are widely ranged for all countries, which illustrates the diversity of the 
selected firms within our sample. Our sample includes 17 countries (7 common law and 10 
code law countries). 
Table 3 also discloses t-values for mean differences between code law and common law 
countries for all variables.  We observe that code law countries exhibits lower audit fees (diff. 
LOGAUDFEE=-0.105, p<0.01), a higher ownership concentration (diff. SHCAP=0.111, 
p<0.01) and a lower managerial ownership (diff. -0.04, p<0.01). These results are consistent 
with the premises of our hypotheses.  
Table 4 discloses the correlation matrix of the dependent variable (audit fees) and the whole 
set of independent variables. 
**** Insert Table 4 here *** 
This matrix shows that the independent variable (LOGAUDFEE) is negatively and 
significantly correlated at 1% to the ownership concentration (SHCAP) and managerial 
shareholding (DCAP) and the occurrence of a loss (LOSS). LOGAUDFEE is also positively 
and significantly correlated at 1% to sales (LOGSALES), leverage (LEV), audit quality 






































0correlations is consistent with our hypotheses. However, we must run the multivariate 
analysis before reaching any conclusion on the relations. 
The magnitudes of the pairwise correlations among firm specific variable do not exceed 0.4, 
with the highest significant correlation being between INVREC and INTPCT (coeff.=0.305, 
p<0.01) and LOGSALES and BIG (coeff.=0.299, p<0.01). We therefore may have no 
correlation concerns. However, Table 4 reports high correlation between country specific 
variables. We therefore also perform regression without the four country-level control 
variables. 
6. Regression results 
All tables presented here report the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the models 
discussed above. P-values are computed using robust standard errors, adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. All the regressions are estimated after 
removing outliers with a Cook’s distance greater than 4/sample size within each country or 
group of countries. This design is similar to Choi et al. (2009). We include a year-effects in all 
regressions, and the cross countries regression include either country-level control variables 
or country-effects. 
Table 5 presents our main tests. 
**** Insert Table 5 here*** 
Due to the inherent colinearity concerns regarding the use of the term and the quadratic term 
in the same regression, we transform SHCAP into its mean-centered CSHCAP, defined as: 
CSHCAP = SHCAP – mean (SHCAP), and thus create CSHCAP2 = CSHCAP
2. 
Model “Code law countries” shows that DCAP has no significant correlation with 
LOGAUDFEE. On the contrary, we observe that model “Common law countries” shows a 
negative and highly significant correlation to LOGAUDFEE (coeff.: -0,453, p<0,01).  
Table 6 reports coefficient comparisons across models, by using Wald tests (Baum 2006), 
with the null hypothesis of coefficient equality. 
**** Insert Table 6 here *** 






































0Therefore we validate H1: Audit fees are more significantly negatively related to managerial 
ownership in strong investor protection countries than in weak investor protection countries.  
Model “Code law countries” shows that CSHCAP (coeff.: -0,423, p<0,01) and CSHCAP2 
(coeff.  : -0.689, p<0,01) are both negatively and highly significantly correlated to 
LOGAUDFEE. This result suggests the existence of a curvilinear (concave) relation between 
audit fees and ownership concentration. 
In addition, Table 6 shows that the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis H0: (β1, β2) = 0 for 
model “Code law countries” and do not reject it for “common law countries”. It also reports 
that both couples (β1, β2) estimates for both countries are not identical. 
Therefore we validate both H2 hypotheses: 
H2.1: Audit fees are first positively then negatively associated (concave relation) with the 
ownership concentration in low investor protection countries. 
H2.2: Audit fees are not related to ownership concentration in high investor protection 
countries. 
We now present some robustness checks. 
7. Robustness analyses 
First, we change the proxy for some independent variables. For instance we substituted the 
natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for size, instead of LOGSALES. We also measured 
SHCAP by the total sum of major shareholders or by the first three major shareholders (La 
Porta et al. 1998, p. 1146), instead of the sum of >5% ownership. Results are qualitatively 
similar. 
Then, we ran a country-level analysis on four countries (Germany, France, UK and USA). 
These countries have been selected as given their economic significance, and their diversity 
regarding investor protection. France and Germany present institutional characteristics which 
are interesting when one wants to study the impact of type II conflict on audit fees. First, the 
generally assumed ownership concentration of the French and German listed firms is likely to 
raise the type II agency conflict (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio and Lang 2002). Then, France 
and Germany have been identified by La Porta et al. (1998) as representative countries of two 






































0weakest investor protection, common law countries provide the highest, with German civil 
law countries being intermediate. La Porta et al. (1998) do not distinguish among common 
law countries. However other studies evidence that within common law countries, that 
investor protection is higher in the US than in the UK. Wingate (Wingate 1997), for instance 
assess the level of protection as 15 for the USA and 10 for UK (and 6.22 for France and 
Germany), on a 15 point scale.. 
Table 7 reports regression results for the four countries. 
**** Insert Table 7 here *** 
Regarding DCAP, France reports a non significant estimate and Germany reports a negative 
and significant at 5% estimate (coeff.: -0,703, p<0,05).  For both common law countries, 
DCPA estimates are negative and very significant (UK: coeff.: -0,728, p<0,01; US: coeff.: -
0,455, p<0,01). Therefore “H1: Audit fees are more significantly negatively related to 
managerial ownership in strong investor protection countries than in weak investor protection 
countries” is confirmed for France (weak investor protection) and the USA and UK (strong 
investor protection) but not for Germany. 
Table 7 shows that ownership concentration estimates for code law countries are consistent 
with hypotheses 2.1: France exhibits a negative and significant SHCAP estimates (coeff.: -
0,416, p<0,05) and SHCAP2 estimates (coeff.: -1.342, p<0,05) and Germany exhibits a 
negative and significant SHCAP estimates (coeff.: -0,535, p<0,01) and SHCAP2 estimates 
(coeff.: -1.151, p<0,05). 
*** Insert Table 8 here*** 
Table 8 shows that the joint test (β1, β2) = 0 is significant for both code law countries (France: 
Chi2=7.15, p<0.01; Germany: Chi2=9.85, p<0.01). Therefore H2.1: “Audit fees are first 
positively then negatively associated (concave relation) with the ownership concentration in 
low investor protection countries” is confirmed. 
Table 8 also reports non significant Chi2 statistics for the USA and significant for UK 
(Chi2=3.06, p<0.05). Therefore, H2.2: “Audit fees are not related to ownership concentration 







































Results presented above provide an interesting perspective on the determination of audit fees 
as well as on the agency conflicts. Our results globally confirm the idea that audit fees include 
a risk premium (Simunic 1980) associated to agency conflicts. Our choice of disentangling 
managerial from controlling shareholding enables us to clearly evidence their mixed effects 
on audit fees, as suggested by  Niemi (2005).  
Managerial ownership is suggested as a governance mechanism to align interests of managers 
to shareholders’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, managerial ownership can also 
create management entrenchment at higher level of managerial ownership (Holderness, 2003; 
Stulz, 1988): the entrenchment/alignment balance has been showed to depend of corporate 
governance system across countries. In our sample, we namely observe different country 
relationships between managerial shareholding and audit fees. In code law countries, which 
provide a low investor protection, there is no relationship. This result is exemplified by 
France case. In common law countries, which provide a higher investor protection, we found 
a strong negative relationship, confirmed by the analysis of the US and UK cases. It therefore 
seems that the alignment hypothesis is mainly evidenced for higher investor protection 
countries. This result could be explained by the existence of a more efficient market discipline 
in higher protection countries such as managerial labor market (Fama, 1980), takeover 
activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983), expert board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), etc. 
 Regarding the ownership concentration, our descriptive results first confirm that code law 
countries exhibit a higher major shareholding concentration. We show that the USA is an 
outlier regarding the diffused ownership: while Germany and France exhibit similar 
ownership concentration (with a mean around 0.45), the USA reports a much lower mean 
(0.26), with the UK in the middle range (mean=0.33). Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argue that ownership structure is designed by each firm so as to be at the optimal level 
in which profits are maximized, given a specific institutional context. One consequence, 
according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), is that concentrated ownership is likely to be found 
mostly in countries with weak shareholder protection: with concentrated shares, controlling 
shareholders are better motivated to provide good monitoring and have enough power to 







































0Concentrated ownership may create agency problem between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, leading to a risk of minority expropriation, as identified by La Porta et 
al. (1998) on lower investor protection countries. Controlling shareholders may exercise their 
power to influence managers for their own benefits without sharing to minority shareholders 
and firms. Opposition between both effects (entrenchment effect versus alignment effect) has 
also been mobilized about minority expropriation risk by controlling shareholders (Morck et 
al. 1988; Claessens et al. 2002; Fan and Wong 2005; Attig et al. 2006; Ali et al. 2007). Once 
again, our results demonstrate a differentiated effect of concentrated ownership on audit fees 
across legal regimes: code law countries exhibit a curvilinear relationship while common law 
countries exhibit no relationships. As given the difficulty in interpreting a log-quadratic 
specification, we graphically represent this relation. 
**** Insert Figure 1 *** 
For lower investor protection countries (France and Germany), our results demonstrate a 
curvilinear (concave) relation between audit fees and the ownership concentration of 
controlling shareholders. Moreover, Figure 1 exhibits a very similar behavior in both 
countries. Therefore, for lower investor protection countries, audit fees first include a risk 
premium related to the minority expropriation risk. Around the turn-over point (around 25%), 
the effect decreases up to zero, then reverses: as the proportion of cash flow held by 
controlling shareholders becomes high, auditors estimate that the expropriation risk decreases 
when ownership concentration increases: advantages drawn from private benefits of control 
seems to become gradually lower that the probable loss incurred by controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, in firms where the concentration of capital held by controlling shareholders is high, 
auditors assess that the type II agency conflict is low, which generates a lower risk premium. 
We therefore validate an entrenchment (resp. alignment) effect on lower (resp. higher) levels 
of concentrated ownership, for lower investor protection levels. 
For higher investor protection countries, our results show that the type II agency conflict is 
not significantly evidenced. In the UK, the quadratic (resp. linear) term is significant (resp. 
not significant) and positive, which means the absence of any risk premium related to a type II 
agency conflict: the positive and significant linear term evidences mainly an alignment effect 
only on the range of data. In the USA, neither the linear nor the quadratic terms are 






































0to a type II agency conflict in higher investor protection countries: a more efficient market 
discipline and a higher litigation risk may explain these results.  
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the influence of ownership concentration levels on audit fees in code 
law and common law countries by disentangling managerial and controlling shareholding 
effects. Overall, our results confirm that audit fees include a risk premium related to type I 
and type II agency conflicts, the latter only for low investor protection countries. We confirm 
these results in two typical code law (France, Germany) countries and two common law 
countries (UK, USA). Our study contributes to research on governance mechanisms by 
evidencing the differential effect of the type II agency conflict in a common versus civil law 
country (La Porta et al. 1998). We show that the effect of agency conflicts on audit fees is 
complex, and depends on the institutional context. Globally speaking, our study supports the 
substitution hypothesis of governance mechanisms (Williamson 1983). However, this study 
suffers from some limits. First of all, our data must be extended to include more country 
variables to cope with more various investor protection levels than embodied in code vs 
common law legal regimes. Then, variables related to ownership are direct and not ultimate 
ownership. Despite these limits, our study aims at improving our understanding of the 
complex relationships between audit fees and ownership structure, by studying the non 
managerial ownership, which remains very rare (Niemi 2005; Hay et al. 2006). Future 
research is needed to evaluate the generality of the results in other institutional contexts of 
investors’ protection. 
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0Table 1: Empirical definitions of variables 
 
Variable  Empirical definition  Data source 
Dependent variable and test variables for Firm i in Country j in Year t 
LOGAUDFEE 
ijt =  natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S dollars 
Worldscope 
SHCAP ij =  the ratio of controlling shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights 
(a) Worldscope 
DCAP ij=  the ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights
(a)  Worldscope 
 
Firm-Specific control variables for Firm i in Country j in Year t 
LOGSALES ijt 
=  natural log of sales in thousands of U.S dollars 
Worldscope 
BIG4 ijt =  1 if a firm uses one the big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise  Worldscope 
LEV ijt =  the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets  Worldscope 
INVEC ijt =  the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales  Worldscope 
INTPCT ijt =  foreign sales divided by total sales  Worldscope 
    
Country-Specific control variables for Country j  
WINGATEj=  indicator of auditor’s litigation risk  Wingate (1997) 
GDPjt=  gross domestic product per capita in thousands of US dollars  International Monetary Fund 
FDIjt=  foreign direct investment (inward) scaled by GDP  United Nation Conference on Trade & Devt
 
Criteria for low/high investor protection countries 
LAWJ=  1 if a common country, and 0 if a code law country  La Porta et al.(1998) 
(a) Worldscope provides us only with current data on ownership structure. We found that, in average, the last update was done in the year 2007. Following Fan et Wong 
(2005), we assume that controlling and management ownership are stable over the studied period. 
 
 





































0Table 2: Sample selection 
 
Nb. of observations with no missing values on audit fees in non East-Asian countries for  2006-2008 27 961
 less: nb. of observations from India and Canada (a)  (3 747)
 less: missing values on shareholding  (3 722) 
less: missing values on other independent variables  (29)
less: nb. of observations from financial institutions (SIC: 6000-6999)  (5 908)
less: nb. of observations from US OTC market or missing data on listing market (b)  (2 607)
less: countries with less than 50 observations (c)  (93)
less: extreme outliers (±3 times interquartile range, country level)  (2328)
less:  Cook’s residual (>4/N, country level)  (2120)
Total Data  8 647
 
(a)  For still unknown reasons, Worldscope provides both countries obviously abnormally low shareholding data. 
(b)  OTC US market requirements are lower for auditors, and missing data on listing markets may create noisy effects on audit fees. 
(c)  Those countries are not included because of an insufficient number of data. 





































0Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Countries  N  LAW  LOGAUDFEE SHCAP  DCAP  LOSS  LEV LOGSALES BIG INVREC INTPCT GDP  FDI  WINGATE 
        (mean)  (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)  (mean)  (mean)  (mean)  (mean)  (mean) (mean) index 
Australia  AUS  463  1  6.541 0.355 0.078      13.104  0.868  0.078 0.260 0.269 0.350 42.190 31.699 10.00 
Switzerland  CHE  65  0  8.232 0.175 0.053      15.185  1.000  0.108 0.206 0.322 0.614 60.634 74.215 6.22 
Germany  DEU  539  0  6.828 0.43 0.036      13.912  0.764  0.141 0.205 0.330 0.467 40.197 19.952 6.22 
Denmark  DNK  50  0  8.199 0.311 0.002      14.661  0.940  0.060 0.238 0.340 0.616 56.381 40.477 4.82 
Spain  ESP  150  0  7.075 0.397 0.106      14.353  0.920  0.053 0.300 0.433 0.369 31.784 39.332 4.82 
Finland  FIN  135  0  6.985 0.288 0.076      14.083  0.926  0.096 0.245 0.319 0.561 46.125 34.595 3.61 
France  FRA  446  0  7.552 0.441 0.088      14.302  0.543  0.085 0.245 0.385 0.457 41.543 35.424 6.22 
U.K.  GBR  1 217  1  7.146 0.332 0.078      13.477  0.850  0.104 0.218 0.286 0.434 43.329 43.406 10.00 
Ireland  IRL  71  1  7.252 0.319 0.069      14.210  0.944  0.099 0.267 0.213 0.525 57.486 70.723 6.22 
Italy  ITA  22  0  6.335 0.298 0.121      13.623  0.864  0.182 0.316 0.644 0.434 35.457 16.087 6.22 
The Nederland  NLD  55  0  9.062 0.322 0.011      15.996  1.000  0.127 0.238 0.329 0.694 47.045 82.272 6.22 
Norway  NOR  52  0  7.806 0.442 0.049      14.486  1.000  0.154 0.311 0.318 0.724 83.538 28.928 6.22 
New-Zealand  NZL  36  1  6.685 0.488 0.119      13.431  1.000  0.028 0.362 0.272 0.569 28.509 51.992 10.00 
Portugal  PRT  34  0  6.997 0.597 0.055      14.421  0.706  0.059 0.408 0.411 0.533 20.920 45.971 3.61 
Sweden  SWE  53  1  8.364 0.263 0.04      15.522  1.000  0.038 0.260 0.335 0.668 48.343 58.107 4.82 
USA  USA  5 129  1  7.58 0.263 0.11      13.881  0.864  0.184 0.230 0.248 0.277 46.336 14.935 15.00 
South Africa  ZAF  130  1  7.476 0.447 0.038      14.470  0.908  0.023 0.179 0.299 0.295 5.687 38.810 4.82 
All countries  8 647    7.407 0.307 0.093      13.870  0.847  0.149 0.232 0.276 0.347  
Code law countries 1 601    7.322 0.397 0.061      14.302  0.770  0.105 0.242 0.360 0.497  
Common law countries 7 046    7.427 0.286 0.101      13.772  0.865  0.159 0.230 0.256 0.313  
Mean (Code law) - Mean(Common law)  -0.105 0.111 -0.04 0.53 -0.095  -0.054 0.012 0.104 0.184  
  t values for mean differences   -2.911*** 18.774***  -10.408*** 10.841***  -10.395***   -6.390*** 2.746*** 28.936***22.841***  
  p values (bivariate tests)  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000  
 
With: LOGAUDFEE: natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S dollars; SHCAP: the ratio of controlling shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; DCAP: the 
ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; LOGSALES: natural log of sales in thousands of U.S dollars; BIG: 1 if a firm uses one the big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC: the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales; INTPCT: foreign sales 
divided by total sales; LAW: 0 if a code law country, and 1 if a common law country; WINGATE: indicator of auditor’s litigation risk (Wingate 1997); GDP=gross domestic 
product per capita in thousands of US dollars; FDI=foreign direct investment (inward) scaled by GDP. 





































0Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
 
  LOGAUDFEE SHCAP  DCAP  LOGSALES BIG  LOSS  LEV INVREC  INTPCT  WINGATE GDP  FDI LAW 
LOGAUDFEE 1    
SHCAP -0.174*** 1   
DCAP -0.238*** -0.024** 1   
LOGSALE 0.777*** -0.161*** -0.263*** 1   
BIG 0.317***  -0.033*** -0.156*** 0.299*** 1   
LOSS -0.063***  0.106*** 0.057*** -0.225*** -0.027** 1    
LEV 0.146*** 0.0556*** -0.036*** 0.155*** 0.081*** 0.049*** 1   
INVREC -0.009 0.048*** -0.064*** -0.101*** -0.109*** 0.013 -0.067*** 1    
INTPCT 0.284*** 0.009 -0.116*** 0.176*** 0.060*** -0.014 -0.077*** 0.305*** 1    
WINGATE 0.117*** -0.229*** 0.133*** -0.054*** 0.067*** 0.113*** -0.018* -0.266*** -0.275*** 1   
GDP 0.100*** -0.135*** 0.038*** 0.019* 0.039*** 0.083*** 0.024** -0.105*** 0.021** 0.331*** 1    
FDI -0.045*** 0.128*** -0.098*** 0.037*** 0.002 -0.107*** 0.015 0.150*** 0.251*** -0.722*** -0.148*** 1  





* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (bivariate tests) 
With: LOGAUDFEE: natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S dollars; SHCAP: the ratio of controlling shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; DCAP: the 
ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; LOGSALES: natural log of sales in thousands of U.S dollars; BIG: 1 if a firm uses one the big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC: the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales; INTPCT: foreign sales 
divided by total sales; LAW: 0 if a code law country, and 1 if a common law country; WINGATE: indicator of auditor’s litigation risk (Wingate 1997); GDP=gross domestic 
product per capita in thousands of US dollars; FDI=foreign direct investment (inward) scaled by GDP. 





































0Table 5: Code vs common law ownership models 
LOGAUDFEE  Predicted 
signs  Code (1)  Code (2)   Common (1)  Common (2)   All (1)  All  (2) 
      b/se  p        b/se  p        b/se  p  b/se  p 
CSHCAP  ?  -0.423***  0.000  -0.409*** 0.000  0.008 0.858  0.036  0.600  -0.071 0.216 -0.034 0.566 
      -0.071     -0.110    -0.043     -0.069    -0.057     -0.059    
QCSHCAP2  ?  -0.689*** 0.004  -0.759**  0.041  -0.165  0.256  -0.345  0.136  -0.439**  0.025 -0.609*** 0.002 
      -0.238     -0.370    -0.145     -0.231    -0.196     -0.197    
DCAP  -  0.078  0.602  0.096  0.658  -0.453*** 0.000  -0.436***  0.000  -0.321*** 0.000 -0.285*** 0.001 
      -0.149     -0.216    -0.056     -0.092    -0.085     -0.087    
LOGSALES  +  0.661*** 0.000  0.667***  0.000  0.487*** 0.000  0.495***  0.000  0.519*** 0.000 0.537*** 0.000 
      -0.012     -0.019    -0.006     -0.009    -0.009     -0.009    
BIG  +  0.269*** 0.000  0.151**  0.030  0.310*** 0.000  0.297***  0.000  0.290*** 0.000 0.241*** 0.000 
      -0.049     -0.069    -0.026     -0.041    -0.035     -0.036    
LOSS  +  0.301*** 0.000  0.275***  0.001  0.289*** 0.000  0.303***  0.000  0.317*** 0.000 0.337*** 0.000 
      -0.063     -0.079    -0.024     -0.029    -0.027     -0.028    
LEV  +  0.567*** 0.000  0.544***  0.001  0.360*** 0.000  0.319***  0.000  0.364*** 0.000 0.318*** 0.000 
      -0.115     -0.166    -0.043     -0.063    -0.059     -0.061    
INVREC  +  0.519*** 0.000  0.478***  0.005  0.680*** 0.000  0.699***  0.000  0.635*** 0.000 0.685*** 0.000 
      -0.122     -0.168    -0.065     -0.095    -0.083     -0.085    
INTPCT  +  0.413*** 0.000  0.422***  0.000  0.811*** 0.000  0.795***  0.000  0.769*** 0.000 0.748*** 0.000 
      -0.074     -0.096    -0.029     -0.045    -0.04     -0.041    
WINGATE  +        0.139***  0.000        0.109***  0.000        0.085***  0.000 
          -0.031          -0.018          -0.005    
GDP  +        0.008***  0.001        -0.009***  0.009        0.002  0.338 
          -0.003          -0.004          -0.002    
FDI  +        0.009***  0.000        0.004  0.214        0.005***  0.000 
          -0.002          -0.003          -0.001    
Constant      -3.402*** 0.000  -4.366***  0.000  -0.850*** 0.000  -1.277***  0.000  -1.789*** 0.000 -2.056*** 0.000 
      -0.222     -0.343    -0.138     -0.271    -0.367     -0.165    
Year effects      Included  Included    Included  Included  Included  Included 
Country effects      Included  Not included    Included  Not included  Included  Not included 
Number of observations    1601  1601  7046  7046  8647  8647 
Adjusted R-square     0.772  0.757  0.694  0.687  0.705  0.692 





































0  31 
p-value     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Schwartz BIC     3721  3777  14886  15011  18859  19111 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (bivariate tests) 
With: CSHCAP (variable SHCAP mean-centered, SHCAP=percentage of controlling shareholders cash flow rights); CSHCAP2 (square of CENTSHCAP).LOGAUDFEE: 
natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S dollars; DCAP: the ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; LOGSALES: natural log of sales in 
thousands of U.S dollars; BIG: 1 if a firm uses one the big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC: the sum of inventories and 
receivables divided by total sales; INTPCT: foreign sales divided by total sales; LAW: 0 if a code law country, and 1 if a common law country; WINGATE: indicator of 







































0Table 6: Code vs common law ownership Wald tests 
 
Panel A: Audit fees and type I agency conflict       
      
Test (DCAP) = 0  Code law  Common law  Code vs common law 
Chi2 0.13  24.79***  5.11** 
p-value 0.720  0.000  0.024 
      
      
      
Panel B: Audit fees and type II agency conflict       
      
Test (CSHCAP & CSHCAP2) = 0  Code law  Common law  Code vs common law 
Chi2 24.81***  0.55  16.93 
p-value 0.000  0.761  0.000 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (bivariate tests) 
With: CSHCAP (variable SHCAP mean-centered, SHCAP= percentage of controlling shareholders cash flow 
rights); CSHCAP2 (square of CENTSHCAP); DCAP: the ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on 







































0Table 7: Four countries ownership models 
LOGAUDFEE    DEU FRA GBR USA 
      signs  b/se p b/se p b/se p b/se p 
CSHCAP  ?  -0.535***  0.001 -0.416** 0.042  -0.238  0.185  0.038  0.644 
      -0.155     -0.202     -0.179     -0.081    
QSHCAP2  ?  -1.151** 0.049 -1.342** 0.029 1.398** 0.021  -0.298  0.270 
      -0.582     -0.608     -0.602     -0.27    
DCAP  -  -0.703**  0.022  0.026  0.932 -0.728*** 0.001 -0.455*** 0.000 
      -0.303     -0.309     -0.22     -0.103    
LOGSALES  +  0.597*** 0.000 0.691*** 0.000 0.546*** 0.000 0.457*** 0.000 
      -0.037     -0.025     -0.02     -0.011    
BIG  +  0.301**  0.014  0.199**  0.012 0.334*** 0.000 0.303*** 0.000 
      -0.121     -0.079     -0.093     -0.045    
LOSS  +  0.323*** 0.003  0.281*  0.055  0.199**  0.011 0.287*** 0.000 
      -0.107     -0.146     -0.078     -0.03    
LEV  +  0.273  0.388  0.646**  0.020 0.592*** 0.000 0.305*** 0.000 
      -0.315     -0.276     -0.167     -0.068    
INVREC  +  -0.015  0.965  0.551**  0.037 0.605*** 0.001 0.795*** 0.000 
      -0.334     -0.262     -0.184     -0.114    
INTPCT  +  0.229  0.224 0.748*** 0.000 0.796*** 0.000 0.870*** 0.000 
      -0.188     -0.15     -0.086     -0.055    
Constant      -1.710*** 0.001 -3.014*** 0.000 -1.127*** 0.000 0.504*** 0.001 
      -0.514     -0.369     -0.269     -0.148    
Year effects      Included  Included  Included  Included 
Country effects      Not included Not  included Not included  Not included 
N    539  446  1217  5129 
Adj. R
2      0.705 0.868 0.747 0.678 
p-value      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Schwartz BIC     1350  829  2548  10465 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01(bivariate tests)           
 
With: CSHCAP (variable SHCAP mean-centered, SHCAP=percentage of controlling shareholders cash flow 
rights); CSHCAP2 (square of CENTSHCAP).LOGAUDFEE: natural log of audit fee in thousands of U.S 
dollars; DCAP: the ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on total cash-flow rights; LOGSALES: 
natural log of sales in thousands of U.S dollars; BIG: 1 if a firm uses one the big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise; 
LEV: the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC: the sum of inventories and receivables divided by 







































0Table 8: Four countries ownership Wald tests 
 
Panel A: Tests within countries: Audit fees and type I agency conflict     
        
Test (DCAP) = 0  DEU  FRA  GBR  USA 
Chi2 5.36**  0.01  10.9***  19.59*** 
p-value 0.022  0.932  0.001  0.000 
        
        
Panel B: Tests within countries: Audit fees and type II agency conflict     
        
Test (CSHCAP & CSHCAP2) = 0  DEU  FRA  GBR  USA 
Chi2 9.85***  7.15***  3.06**  0.61 
p-value 0.000  0.001  0.048  0.543 
 
 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (bivariate tests) 
With: CSHCAP (variable SHCAP mean-centered, SHCAP= percentage of controlling shareholders cash flow 
rights); CSHCAP2 (square of CENTSHCAP); DCAP: the ratio of managers’ shareholders cash flow rights on 
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This figure represents the predicted values of LOGAUDFEE for different values of SHCAP, as measured by the following equation: 
LOGAUDFEE = β1 CSHCAP + β2 CSHCAP2 
Where β1 and β2 are the significant (at 10% level) estimates given for each country by the regression equation presented in Table 7. 
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